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RÉSUMÉ
Dans cet article, nous analysons la corrélation entre les revenus de travail
contemporains et les conditions sur le marché du travail, à savoir le taux de chômage
mesuré à différents moments pendant la durée du contrat de travail. Les données que
nous utilisons proviennent du Panel Socio-économique Allemand et comprennent la
période 1984-1994. Contrairement aux résultats pour le marché américain, nous trouvons
que l'état actuel du marché du travail est un important facteur, même en contrôlant pour le
taux de chômage en vigueur au début de la relation d'emploi. Les élasticités estimées
varient entre 9 et 15 pourcent pour l'élasticité des revenus de travail par rapport au taux de
chômage contemporain et entre 6 et 10 pourcent par rapport au taux de chômage en
début de contrat. Notamment, tandis que le taux de chômage régional affecte le niveau
des revenus d'emploi, le taux national influence la variation dans les revenus. Ces
résultats sont cohérents avec la présence simultanée de conventions collectives et de
contrats individuels, tels les modèles de contrats implicites, qui expliquent une partie de la
variance de revenus de travail et des mouvements de revenu à long terme. En plus de la
variation régionale, nous étudions l'hétérogénéité des contrats selon certaines
caractéristiques des travailleurs et des emplois. En particulier, nous constatons que les
contrats de travail diffèrent selon la taille de l'entreprise et le type de travailleur. Un
travailleur dans une grande entreprise est remarquablement plus isolé de fluctuation du
marché de travail qu'un travailleur dans toute autre taille d'entreprise, suggérant
l'importance des marchés du travail internes pour ces firmes.
Mots clés : courbe de salaire, contrats implicites, structure des salaires, Allemagne
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we look at how labor market conditions at different points during the
tenure of individuals with firms are correlated with current earnings. Using data on
individuals from the German Socioeconomic Panel for the 1985-1994 period, we find that
both the contemporaneous unemployment rate and prior values of the unemployment rate
are significantly correlated with current earnings, contrary to results for the American labor
market. Estimated elasticities vary between 9 and 15 percent for the elasticity of earnings
with respect to current unemployment rates, and between 6 and 10 percent with respect to
unemployment rates at the start of current firm tenure. Moreover, whereas local
unemployment rates determine levels of earnings, national rates influence
contemporaneous variations in earnings. We interpret this result as evidence that German
unions do, in fact, bargain over wages and employment, but that models of individualistic
contracts, such as the implicit contract model, may explain some of the observed wage
drift and longer-term wage movements reasonably well. Furthermore, we explore the
heterogeneity of contracts over a variety of worker and job characteristics. In particular, we
find evidence that contracts differ across firm size and worker type. Workers of large firms
are remarkably more insulated from the job market than workers for any other type of firm,
indicating the importance of internal job markets.
Key words : wage curve, implicit contracts, wages structure, Germany
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Abstract
In this paper  we look at how labor market conditions at dierent points during the tenure of
individuals with rms are correlated with current earnings Using data on individuals from the
German Socioeconomic Panel for the period  to   we nd that both the contemporaneous
unemployment rate and prior values of the unemployment rate are signicantly correlated with
current earnings  contrary to results for the American labor market Estimated elasticities vary
between  and  percent for the elasticity of earnings with respect to current unemployment rates 
and between 	 and 
 percent with respect to unemployment rates at start of current rm tenure
Moreover  whereas local unemployment rates determine levels of earnings  national rates inuence
contemporaneous variations in earnings We interpret this result as evidence that German unions
do in fact bargain over wages and employment  but that models of individualistic contracts  such
as the implicit contract model  may explain some of the observed wage drift and longerterm wage
movements reasonably well Furthermore  we explore the heterogeneity of contracts over a variety
of worker and job characteristics In particular  we nd evidence that contracts dier across rm
size and worker type Workers of large rms are remarkably more insulated from the job market
than workers for any other type of rm  indicating the importance of internal job markets
Dans cet article  nous analysons la corrlation entre les revenus de travail contemporains et
les conditions sur le march du travail   savoir le taux de chmage  mesur  dirents moments
pendant la dure du contrat de travail Les donnes que nous utilisons proviennent du Panel Socio
conomique Allemand  et comprennent la priode  Contrairement aux rsultats pour le
march amricain  nous trouvons que ltat actuel du march du travail est un important facteur
mme en contrlant pour le taux de chmage en vigueur au dbut de la relation demploi Les
lasticits estimes varient entre  et  pourcent pour llasticit des revenus de travail par rapport
au taux de chmage contemporain  et entre 	 et 
 pourcent par rapport au taux de chmage en
dbut de contrat Notamment  tandis que le taux de chmage rgional aecte le niveau des revenus
demploi  le taux national inuence la variation dans les revenus Ces rsultats sont cohrents
avec la prsence simultane de conventions collectives et de contrats individuels  tels les modles de
contrats implicites  qui expliquent une partie de la variance de revenus de travail et des mouvements
de revenu  long terme En plus de la variation rgionale  nous tudions lhtrogenit des contrats
selon certains caractristiques des travailleurs et des emplois En particulier  nous constatons que
les contrats de travail dirent selon la taille de lentreprise et le type de travailleur Un travailleur
dans une grande entreprise est remarquablement plus isol de uctuation du march de travail
quun travailleur dans toute autre taille dentreprise  suggrant limportance des marchs du travail
internes pour ces rmes
Keywords Wage curve  Implicit contracts  Wage structure  Germany
JEL  J  Contracts J Wage Level and Structure J Employment Determination
Mots cls Courbe de salaire  contrats implicites  structure des salaires  Allemagne
JEL  J  Contrats J Niveau et structure des salaires J Dtrmination de lemploi
  Introduction
Earnings constitute a large fraction of household income  and factors aecting earnings thus have
a major impact on the distribution of income The secular rise in unemployment in recent years in
Europe and Canada has renewed interest in the interaction between labor market conditions and
earnings In the present paper  we report results from an analysis of German panel data in the view
of a set of wage models The results shed new light on some aspects of the dynamics of German
earnings with respect to labor market conditions  and underlines the fact that labor markets in
Europe are dierent from North American markets
Specically  we look at how measures of labor market conditions at dierent points during
the tenure of individuals with rms aect their current earnings These measures are chosen to
approximate dierent types of contractual models In a simple model of implicit contracts  if
workers are not mobile  their wage will depend on their alternative employment utility at the
start of the current job if employers can commit to longterm contracts On the other hand  if they
are mobile  current wages will depend on their best alternative utility since the start of their job
Here as in other papers  the alternative utility at a point in time is approximated by the rate of
unemployment In contrast hereto stand models in which the current wage will depend exclusively
on current labor market conditions This may be consistent with a number of models  including a
standard labor demand model  an eciency wage model  as well as a union bargaining model Given
the German institutional background  we argue that the most likely interpretation is the latter
Using data on individuals from the German Socioeconomic Panel for the period 	
 to 		 
we nd that both the contemporaneous unemployment rate and prior values of the unemployment
rate are signicantly correlated with current earnings We interpret this result as evidence that
German unions do in fact bargain over wages and employment  but that models of individualistic

contracts  such as the implicit contract model  may explain some of the observed wage drift and
longerterm wage movements reasonably well The elasticity of earnings with respect to contempo
raneous unemployment is between  and  percent  on par with previous studies of the German
labor market The eect of initial unemployment lies between  and  percent Decomposing the
unemployment measure into regional components reveals that regional labor market conditions de
termine the initial	 level of earnings  and national labor market conditions aect contemporaneous
variations
Furthermore  we explore the heterogeneity of contracts over a variety of worker and job charac
teristics In particular  we 
nd evidence that contracts dier across industries and across 
rm size
Workers of large 
rms are remarkably more insulated from the job market than workers for any
other type of 
rm  indicating the importance of internal job markets Blue collar workers are more
strongly aected by contemporaneous labor market conditions than white collar workers
The results obtained in this paper provide empirical evidence in line with previous articles on
implicit contracts in the United States Beaudry  DiNardo 	 It augments and quali
es results
reported in the literature on the wage curve Blanchower  Oswald   Wagner 	  where
current earnings are correlated with current unemployment Beaudry  DiNardo 	 showed
that this empirical result is not robust to the inclusion of unemployment rates appropriately chosen
during the current employment spell Our results bridge this gap  implying that the latter result
may be an artifact speci
c to the US economy  and only partially true for Germany
The paper is organized as follows Section  gives an overview of the models that we use to
obtain predictions as to the correlation between the history of labor market conditions and current
earnings As we briey mentioned above  institutions are relevant to interpreting the results  and we
briey describe some institutional background in Section  In Section   we describe the data used
Section  describes the results obtained and some of the econometric issues relating to these In

Section   we test the robustness of the results from the previous section across dierent dimensions
of worker and job characteristics Section  concludes and oers an outlook to further analysis
  Theoretical background
The relationship between wages and unemployment has often been discussed in the literature
The robust empirical relationship between contemporaneous unemployment and wages the wage
curve has been amply documented and the possible models underlying this phenomenon discussed
in Blanch	ower 
 Oswald  An IAB publication sums up recent results on German wage
curves Mitteilungen aus der Arbeitsmarkt  und Berufsforschung   see also Pannenberg 

Schwarze  and Wagner 
A number of models have implications linking contemporaneous unemployment to wages ranging
from compensating dierentials to incentive contracts Others predominantly based on contracts
link past measures of labor market tightness to current earnings We will expose here the salient
characteristics of the most important ones
Implicit contracts
The basic idea in the literature on implicit contracts is that riskaverse workers can only insure
themselves with their riskneutral employers against shocks to labor productivity The resulting
labor contracts contain an implicit insurance clause and will depend on the mobility assumptions
for both workers and rms Suppose that productivity follows an AR with parameter   Assume
further that rms can commit to contracts and that they compete for workers for whom mobility
will initially be assumed to be costly Then it can be shown Beaudry 
 DiNardo  that wages

are rigid during tenure  and will depend on the alternative wage w and expected productivity  
 

logw
t t 
  

   logw
t
 

   log  
 
 k 
where 
j
are reduced form functions of the structural parameters   discount rate  and the workers
survival probability   and t the point in time at which current tenure started A general
equilibrium argument relating the change in the workers reservation wage to the participation
wage establishes the link with unemployment  leading to a estimable form of 
logw
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where we denote by u
t
the relevant measure of unemployment determining wages at time t  by U
t
the level of the unemployment rate at time t The vector X
it
includes the usual human capital
controls thought to a	ect a workers productivity in logs Since workers are not mobile  their
wages will be a function only of unemployment at the start of the job  as denoted by 
Renegotiation proof contracts
If workers are mobile but 
rms can still commit to the employment contract  then the optimal
contract resulting from the above setup will be upward exible  being renegotiated every time
the workers alternative utility becomes binding Harris  Holmstrom  Linking as before
alternative utility to unemployment implies that the lowest level of unemployment since the start

of the current contract will be the principal determinant of the current wage  Thus
u
t
  min
p  t t
U
p

replaces   Once renegotiated the initial level of unemployment does not inuence current wages
anymore and wages will be function only of unemployment rates at the time of renegotiation 
One critique of the above model is the lack of incentive compatibility for the employer  The
employer is assumed to be able to commit to longterm contracts  If however the employers out
side option in a contractual relationship becomes binding it is optimal to renegotiate  MacLeod
	 Malcomson 

 
have pointed out that if one increases the contract space by allowing for
discretionary bonuses then any allocation of the surplus from a relation may be consistent with an
equilibrium  The ecient contract will x a wage at the beginning of a relationship according to a
split of the surplus  Since this split is the result of some bargaining process between the two parties
and thus Paretoecient no party will want to renegotiate afterwards except if one partys outside
option is larger than the utility obtained from continuing the present contract  If this constraint
becomes binding both parties will renegotiate and the new contract will reect the split of the
surplus at the time of renegotiation 
If the workers outside options are a decreasing function of unemployment then the wage in the
current contract will reect the best labor market conditions since the start of the contract as in the
implicit contract model with the supplementary condition that the employers outside option was
never binding in the meantime and conditional on the value of the best labor market conditions
occurring say at time t   t having been higher not only than the value of the outside option
at time t but also higher than the value of the contract at time t  Hence the same conditions
 
See also MacLeod   Malcomson 

derived from the costless mobility version of the implicit contract model are consistent with the
contract model here  but are neither a necessary nor a sucient condition for this model Thus 
though we may nd that our results are consistent with this model  we cannot test it formally  as
our regressions cannot falsify its implications
E ciency wage
Turning to links between contemporaneous labor market conditions and wages  one model frequently
drawn upon to explain such a correlation is the eciency wage model Eciency wage models of
the shirking type
 
suggest that incentives to furnish eort derive from the threat of losing a surplus
extant in a relationship This surplus may be generated by direct mobility costs  the presence
of specic human capital or a number of other reasons The link most commonly studied is the
one proposed not exclusively by Shapiro  Stiglitz 	
 There  unemployment implies a loss in
utility since the probability of immediate reemployment is less than unity Thus  there is a benet to
the employee of staying with the current employer The model thus directly links unemployment to
eort levels and wages Wages are the carrots and unemployment the stick to achieve an equilibrium
in which no shirking occurs
Eort e can be either high or low  and can be detected with probability q If caught shirking  the
employee is red  in which case he receives unemployment benets w
 
while unemployed In every
period that he is unemployed  he will be reemployed with probability a The incentive compatible
wage derived from the model is then
w   e w
 
 ea b r q 
 
The most frequently cited paper is Shapiro   Stiglitz  See Carmichael  and Lang   Kahn 
for a critical look at e	ciency wage models

where r is the discount rate  In equilibrium the ows out of unemployment a N L must be equal
to ows out of employment bL so that a b  b u  Substituting in  obtains
w  e w
 

e
q
 
b
u
 r


which shows a negative relationship between wages and unemployment  Note however that due to
the forwardlooking character of the incentive constraint the appropriate measure u is the expected
value of future unemployment  If unemployment follows a unit root process the current unemploy
ment rate is sucient to form expectations of future unemployment rates  Thus past values should
not inuence current wages once contemporaneous unemployment has been controlled for and the
eciency wage model implies
u
t
 U
t
 	
Union bargaining models
In models of collective bargaining a union with a wellde
ned concave utility function is assumed
to bargain over wages and possibly employment with a pro
tmaximizing 
rm  If the bargaining
agenda only covers wages the resulting contract locus will coincide with the labor demand curve
implying a negative relationship between wages and employment and thus a positive correlation
between unemployment and wages 
If the bargaining agenda covers both elements and bargaining powers on each issue are equal
 
the
slope of the contract locus will depend on the unions risk aversion  If the union is riskaverse
the contract locus will have a positive slope in wageemployment space thus implying a negative
correlation between unemployment and wages  Heterogeneity in relative bargaining powers allows
 
See Manning   for an analysis of when bargaining powers are not equal on each issue
	
identi cation of this curve The relative bargaining powers of union and  rm are reected in the
position along this curve If unions andor  rms dier in their relative bargaining powers a cross
section of contracts will identify the slope of the contract curve
Estimation
The model estimated is
logw
t
  X
 
t
   u
 
t
 	
where u
t
is now a vector with the three elements described by 
	 	 and 	 Conditional on the
right unemployment rate other measures of unemployment do not predict wages and a test of
the three alternative hypotheses resulting from the above theoretical models is equivalent to a test
on the coecients on the dierent measures of unemployment Note however that not all the above
models are mutually exclusive If only one element of  is signi cant then we can exclude some
but not all models As we will  nd results are more equivocal
  Institutional background
Our aim in this paper is to characterize the contract structure of wages and in this respect labor
institutions matter The particular importance of trade unions in the German model has often been
pointed out This section describes some pertinent aspects of German labor market institutions
 
The German economy is characterized by a high degree of coverage by collective agreements
Although union membership is around  percent

union coverage by either industrywide or  rm
level contracts lies at around  percent of the eligible population

Most contracts are negotiated
 
For a good introduction see f i  Flanagan Soskice  Ulman  for some recent developments in collective
bargaining Thelen  

Author	s tabulation from years in which this question was asked for in the GSOEP  See also Carruth  Schnabel
 

Bundesministerium f
r Arbeit und Sozialordnung   Industries with little coverage are predominantly in

at the level of a regional industry  Thus collective agreements on wages and earnings are dened for
  regionindustry cells in Western Germany and  in Eastern Germany Bundesministerium
f	r Arbeit und Sozialordnung 

  The number of rms having individual contracts with unions
outside of the industrywide agreement has been slightly increasing in recent years but it is unclear
whether the number of workers covered by these contracts has increased 
Regional and crossindustry dierences exist but there is informal coordination by the German
Federation of Unions Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund  DGB  Informal evidence for spillover eects
is widespread  Furthermore the Minister of Labor can legally extend contracts to the whole industry
under certain circumstances  Thus in 

 the wage and earnings contracts were actually extended
in  of the above regionindustry cells Bundesministerium f	r Arbeit und Sozialordnung 

 pg 

 
  It has been shown that when rms face a high enough probability of extension they will act
as if they were actually covered by the collective bargaining agreement Margolis 

  For these
reasons our data does not distinguish whether or not workers are covered by collective bargaining
agreements  Some variation nevertheless exists and for many rms the industrywide agreement
only acts as a wage oor Bellmann 

 allowing us to perform a more detailed analysis in Section
 
The duration of collective agreements on wages and earnings is usually one year  However in

 and 

 a signicant part of the collective agreements signed had minimum durations of up
to three years  This was apparently a onetime phenomenon linked to the ongoing negotiations over
hours reductions and most of the threeyear contracts expiring were followed by the usual oneyear
contracts 
A feature that Germany shares with other European economies is the severely restricted use of
the services sector  Only workers contributing to the social insurance system are covered by collective agreements 
 
These extensions occur predominantly in retail trade and in the cleaning industry 


 xedlength contracts Over most of the sample period German law restricted  xedlength contracts
to  months Though the law allows for renewal utilization seems to be quite low
 
Only about 
percent of workers declaring themselves as working fulltime are on  xed length contracts compared
to  percent of parttime workers Women are slightly more likely to be on  xed length contracts
then men 	
 and  percent respectively
Finally the relevant compensation variable we consider are earnings Contrary to North Amer
ica where bluecollar workers tend to receive hourly compensation German bluecollar workers
tend to be compensated like whitecollar workers on a monthly or biweekly basis Thus  per
cent of workers in Western Germany are covered by contracts which do not dierentiate between
blue and white collar workers and in which both categories are paid a monthly salary invariant in
hours For a further  percent of blue collar workers the collective agreement though separate
from that for white collar workers speci es a  xed monthly salary Bundesministerium fr Arbeit
und Sozialordnung 
  Data and estimation
The data used comes from the German SocioEconomic Panel GSOEP We will briey describe
some aspects this dataset that are of importance to the present study Wagner Burkhauser 
Behringer  and Burkhauser  provide a more detailed description of the public use  le
available outside Germany
The GSOEP is a longitudinal panel data set  rst created in  Respondents are reinterviewed
each year Response rates are quite high Children are followed separately once they leave the
original household providing for some nonrandom compensation for panel attrition The questions
 
The degree of utilization in our sample is actually decreasing over the sample period  though this may be a result
of the nonrandom sampling nature of the GSOEP Hunt  describes the changes and estimates the eect on
employment For the role of 	xedlength contracts in France  see Abowd  Corbel 
 Kramarz 

asked are not restricted to economic questions  ranging from social to political subjects Through the
structure has varied from year to year  a great deal of homogeneity has been preserved  facilitating
comparison over the years A new  East German panel was started after German unication in

The survey instrument for the GSOEP was modeled after the PSID  and tries to avoid some
of the problems the latter dataset had Thus  the question on job tenure is fairly unambiguous 
 
asking respondents the month and year they started working for their current employer

Some
problems nevertheless occur For example  in some waves  a number of questions relating to the
job market and the current job were only asked of job changers If this occurs  or data is missing 
we carry forward information obtained in the previous wave conditional on the worker reporting no
change in his job situation wrt the previous year Furthermore  if an individual reports conicting
data on the year she started working with the present employer  we use and carry forth the earliest
report of a date In this manner  we force tenure to be consistent across year
Throughout  results are reported for net and gross real earnings We would expect net earnings
to be the variable of interest to workers  and thus the pertinent variable in union bargaining  though
gross earnings are closer to the true cost of labor to the employer  and thus more appropriate in
models imposing a zero prot condition Hence  it is not clear which to use  and we avoid having
to choose by using both variables
We restrict our sample to blue and white collar workers with contracts of indeterminate length
who are working fulltime  and are German nationals living in Western Germany We exclude
workers with xed length contracts at this stage due to ambiguity inherent to such contracts in the
 
See Altonji   Shakotko  and Topel  for a treatment of the problems with the tenure data in the
PSID

This author has worked with both the English translation and the original German questionnaires and has found
that in some waves the English translation of the tenure question renders ambiguous what is not in German More
information is available from the author upon demand

context of the theoretical models 
  
Due to the unavailability of data on contract duration in 
our sample is restricted to the years  to  and due to unavailability of regional unemployment
rates prior to  only workers having started their jobs since are included  As a glance at Figure 
on page 	 shows though there is still considerable variation in the unemployment rates there is a
signi
cant upward trend over this period  In Section  this will subject of discussion 
  
Excluding
workers in agriculture and in the public sector as well as civil servants scattered in other industries
leaves us with  	 observations on   individuals 

Of these   have valid observations
on net income  Finally we eliminate individuals who have only one observation in the sample since
at least two observations are necessary to be able to eliminate individualspeci
c eects  Table 
gives a summary of the reductions made  Sample statistics are given in Table  
Contemporaneous unemployment rates are merged into the GSOEP using the month preceding
the interview month for which earnings are reported  Initial unemployment rate is taken from the
quarter the current job is reported to have started if available  Otherwise the average unemployment
rate over the year in which the job started is used  Minimum unemployment is computed by
searching between the starting date of the employment relation and the current date  For part of
the analysis regional unemployment rates were used either in levels in deviations from the national
average or in proportional deviation from the national average 

A more complete description of
the data is given in a separate appendix 
  
Separation for these contracts is exogenous  except if the contract is transformed into one of indeterminate length
It is unclear whether renegotiation will occur during the short duration of the contract Furthermore  our data does
not allow us to determine whether a xed length contract in two consecutive years is with the same employer  and the
tenure question may be ambiguous in these cases Most previous studies seem to not have excluded these workers
Results obtained here when including them are not drastically dierent
  
An earlier version of this paper used only national unemployment data reaching back to 

About half of the eliminations for missing variables are due to missing initial experience

See Figure  on page 

  Results
The main results of this paper are reported in Table   on page  To estimate Equation  we
have controlled for experience and tenure up to squared terms education as measured in years
dummies for industry marital status
  
a linear trend

Errors reported here are not corrected for
heteroskedasticity but results using the White 	
correction yielded very similar results Fixed
eects were ushed out by using deviations from individual specic means
  
Rows  to   show results obtained when including only measures of past labor market tightness
Note that unemployment is measured in percent and thus the reported coecient implies that an
increase in the unemployment rate of one point reduces net monthly earnings by  percent in
specication   When including each measure individually the estimated coecients have the
predicted signs but the eect of minimum unemployment is not very precisely estimated Including
both reveals a positive and signicant eect of the lowest unemployment rate In Rows  to  the
current unemployment is included in various combinations with the two previous measures Row 
corresponds to the typical wage curve regression Blanchower  Oswald  The estimated
coecient on current unemployment is stable across all specications and precisely estimated
suggesting that it is orthogonal to the other two measures

When again including only one or the
other measure of past labor market performance the same scenario as before is produced

We use an indicator for the status of being single  Other dummy variables led to comparable results 

Other specications were tested especially up to cubic terms in experience and tenure  Nested Ftests cannot
reject a quadratic against the null of a cubic specication at the  percent level but can reject a linear against a
cubic specication  However the linear specication cannot be rejected against the null of a quadratic specication
at  percent level  It is thus not clear based upon these tests which specication to choose 

We tested xed eects against random eects in a variety of specications  A Hausman 	
 test always rejected
the random eects specication by a large margin  For instance for the regression reported in Table  on page 
Column b  
 
   with  degrees of freedom thus soundly rejecting the hypothesis that random eects are
the correct specication 

Note that we are not including regional eects  Geographical mobility is very low in our data  only  moves
are observed  and any regional eects are ushed out by the individual xed eects 

A wellknow problem in the data as used here is aggregation bias  The results presented in the main text are
not corrected for aggregation bias but tests in a number of specications showed that the results are not sensitive to
a correction  For reasons of comparability with results presented in the literature we present microlevel regression
results throughout  Appendix A  on page  gives more details 
 
The positive sign of the lowest unemployment rate since the start of a job is surprising  and
does not t any one of the models of Section  One possible explanation may be a selection
model Generally  higher unemployment is correlated with a higher separation rate Employers
have less liberty of laying o individual workers than in the United States  and it is in fact easiest
to lay o a worker for economic reasons If employers at that time select to keep only higher
productivity workers  and if earnings reect productivity  than those having experienced periods of
high unemployment and are still unemployed will tend to be in more productive matches 
  
leading
to the observed sign
Row  captures the main result of this paper There is a strong eect on current earnings
through current unemployment However  previous conditions in the labor market are also signif	
icantly correlated with current earnings The elasticities corresponding to the point estimates in
Row  are about 
 percent for contemporaneous unemployment and about  percent for initial
unemployment Neither a model that correlates only the contemporaneous unemployment rate with
earnings  such as the simpler eciency wage models as well as rent	sharing and spot market models 
nor the implicit contract models are sucient by themselves to explain the dynamics of earnings
However  the fact that there is a strong correlation between initial and lowest unemployment in
our sample may cast some doubt on the result that it necessarily be the initial unemployment rate
that inuences unemployment The average time elapsed between start of the job and occurrence of
the lowest unemployment rate in the sample is  months  months conditional on being strictly
positive  and for only  percent of the observations  this value is larger than  months Thus  it
is possible that we cannot distinguish the two eects Section  will pursue this point further
Table  on page  reports equivalent results using gross instead of net earnings as dependent
  
Note that this must be match specic eect since individual eects have been ushed out See fi Gibbons 
Katz 		


variable  Coecients are generally of smaller magnitude possibly due to the progressive German
income tax schedule 
Turning our attention to Table  on page  we report separate results for men  Our sample is
disproportionately composed of men furnishing  percent of sample observations and  percent of
the sample population  Tenure for men is longer the distribution across industries is di	erent and
men are more likely to be blue
collar workers  Furthermore since the participation decision is not
modeled here it is a standard result that coecients may be biased 
  
Part of the results in Tables
 and  seems to be driven by the female part of the sample  Male earnings are more strongly
correlated with current unemployment whereas measures of past labor market performance are
smaller in absolute values  In what follows we concentrate only on the male subsample 

However
all previous patterns apparent in di	erent specications in particular the positive sign on minimum
unemployment carry over to the analysis of the male sample 
Row BD at the bottom of Table  reports the results obtained by Beaudry  DiNardo 
for the United States  In PSID data the e	ect of minimum unemployment rate clearly dominates
the e	ect of contemporaneous and of initial unemployment rate the latter not being signicantly
di	erent from zero  The German case is more nuanced lending support to a mixture or simultaneous
presence of two mechanisms  The rst a	ects current earnings through the current state of the labor
market  A number of models can be consistent with this result as we have expounded in Section  
However the institutional background outlined in Section  would lend credence to a rejection of a
simple spot market model in favor of a model of rent
sharing  The negative e	ect of unemployment
  
Heckman   Mroz   Groot Mekkelholt 	 Osterbeek  
 show in the case of the Netherlands
that estimates of the eect of contemporaneous unemployment for women may be severely biased if no selfselection
correction is done and that current unemployment aects not only the wage but also the participation decision See
also Strm 	 Wagenhals   on female labor supply in Germany

In regressions not reported here female earnings are strongly correlated with the initial unemployment rate It
might be interesting to study the eect of local labor market conditions on longterm labor participation rates of
women

can then be interpreted as evidence of risk averse unions bargaining over both employment and
wages if bargaining powers are heterogeneous across industries The resulting bargaining outcome
then feeds imperfectly into individual contracts still allowing for aspects of implicit contracts to
have eect It may be seen as corroborating evidence that unions have in recent years put a
stronger emphasis on reduction of hours in order to maintain or increase employment Our results
are consistent with this
In the next section we study the robustness of the above results before drawing a nal conclusion
  Robustness of results
In this section we consider dierent subsamples in order to test the robustness of the results obtained
in the previous section Since labor markets may function dierently for individuals characterized
by the size of the rm or the industry they work in or by particular characteristics of their labor
market history not only may this characteristic inuence his level of earnings but may in fact alter
the compensation structure Furthermore the results may be sensitive to the particular time period
considered picking up some time specic artifact rather than a general phenomenon
  Firm size
A number of models have shown that the labor market may be segmented into tiers of jobs that
function as a ladder for a number of reasons
  
Conceivably progression up the ladder is associated
with increasing rm size On the other hand these jobs may be within one large rm and constitute
an internal hierarchy of jobs Furthermore some studies have shown that rm size aects earnings
and wages not only through worker quality   which we capture with xed eects   but through
  
A recent example is Jovanovic   Nyarko  and see Soskice  for such an explanation for the German
market for apprentices

 rmworker matches Abowd Kramarz  Margolis forthcoming If  rms are homogeneous within
size categories this will again be reected in dierences in the remuneration structure
It could be argued that  rm size is a bad instrument for job ladders as collective bargaining
agreements cover all companies within an industry irrespective of their size as outlined in Section 	
However variations do exist and as we will see are important
Results are reported in Table 
 on page 	
  
A dichotomy appears between very large  rms
more than two thousand employees and smaller ones Whereas contemporaneous labor market
tightness has no signi cant eect on wages in the former smaller  rms are remarkably homogeneous
as to the eect of contemporaneous unemployment Note that the coecient decreases as  rm size
increases reduced to insigni cance for very large  rms Coecients on previous labor market
performance exhibit the same pattern as before but the magnitude is much larger for very small
 rms In large  rms net earnings are unaected by any labor market conditions but as Table  on
page 	 reports there is a marginally signi cant eect in gross earning
Thus both with respect to variation in ongoing contracts as well as for initial conditions smaller
 rms seem to be a lot more sensitive to market conditions than very large  rms It is worth noting
that in results not reported here

the return to initial experience is stronger relative to  rmspeci c
experience for tiny  rms This  ts well with the fact that  rms with less than  employees are
not subject to the fairly stringent German layo regulations

allowing them to participate more
actively in search activities Workers tenure at these also is lower than elsewhere also suggesting
that job security is less than perfect and that adjustment not only occurs on the wage margin
At the other extreme and markedly dierent from the intermediate categories lie the very
large companies Initial experience  nds no remuneration whereas  rmspeci c experience is more
  
Firm size is reported in  ve categories Table  on page  reports frequencies and the average tenure of jobs in
each type of  rm

Results available from the author upon request

See fi Hunt  on the e	ects of layo	 costs on employment in Germany


highly remunerated  Again one might nd this consistent with the view that large rms have a
more strongly hierarchical structure and provide for stable internal career paths  This nds support
in the observation that average tenure is increasing and initial experience decreasing in rm size in
Table  
  Blue vs white collar
As pointed out earlier bluecollar pay in Germany is much more similar to whitecollar remuneration
than in North America  However since we cannot distinguish between hourly pay and monthly
remuneration the distinction according to status serves as a proxy  Alternatively the method of
remuneration may not be the only aspect aecting remuneration dynamics 
Accepting status as a proxy for remuneration methods it is still not clear whether bluecollar
pay should vary more or less with labormarket conditions  In an implicit contract model earnings
are consumption and should if perfectly insured not vary with contemporaneous unemployment 
However if rms can adjust hours as well as pay then wage rates may well change  The labor market
institutions outlined in Section  seem to imply that for most whitecollar workers remuneration
does not vary with hours and this applies to a signicant portion of bluecollar workers as well 
However given the extant discrepancies we would expect more variance in bluecollar wage rates
rather than earnings when compared to whitecollar wage rates 
Table  on page  reports results on separate regressions for blue and whitecollar workers 
The results are qualitatively similar to those previously obtained  However the eect of the con
temporaneous unemployment rate is weaker for white collar workers than for blue collar workers
and the coe	cients on previous labor market performance are larger 
in absolute value for white
collar workers though not signicant for either worker type 
  
For both worker types the impact
  
In other regressions  results were not dierent when using wage rates instead of earnings

of the implicit contract type measures is weakened  but the results suggest nevertheless that white
collar earnings depend to a larger degree on labor market conditions at the start of the present
employment  and to a lesser degree on contemporaneous uctuations
  Regional and temporal variation
Nearly  percent of reported earnings refer to the rst quarter of the survey year  and thus there is
very little intrayear variation in the unemployment rates Though a linear time trend is included
in all regressions  capturing the upward trend over the time period of earnings see Figure  on
page 	
  the inclusion of year dummies mimics the path of the unemployment rate In order to
separate pure year eects from eects related to labor market conditions  some other dimension of
variation is necessary
In our case  we used two approaches to take this possibility into account First  we use data on
regional unemployment rates at the Bundesland state
 level instead of the national averages as
the relevant unemployment measures Results are reported in Table  on page 		  Column b
 
whereas Column a
 takes up the results from Table  on page 	 The results are qualitatively
the same as for the national measures  but the magnitude of the coecient on contemporaneous
unemployment is reduced  whereas those on contractual measures are increased Thus  the addition
of intrayear variation does not alter the general conclusion
A second approach splits the sample into subperiods A glance at the upper left panel of Figure 
on page 	 shows that although a substantial increase in unemployment followed the oil crisis of
the early s  mean unemployment in the s lies below mean unemployment in the s If in fact
the coecients on unemployment do not reect pure year eects  than the estimates should not be
overly
 sensitive to the period chosen Column c
 in Table  presents results for a sample of jobs
starting after 	 only  using regional unemployment rates Note that for this subsample  average

initial unemployment will be higher  but there is still substantial variation in the unemployment rate
over the period to identify any eect of contemporaneous unemployment on changes in earnings
Again  though point estimates are higher  the qualitative results do not change
This approach can also be viewed from a dierent angle Given the upward trend in unemploy
ment in the data  a substantial percentage of persons in our sample will have experienced their best
labor market conditions at the start of the job their minimum unemployment rate is equal to their
initial unemployment rate In the sample used for Columns a and b  this is the case for around
 percent of all observations If this is in fact driving our results  then curtailing the sample to
those individuals in jobs that started within a period in which the unemployment rate does not
have a linear trend  and thus this coincidence occurs less frequently  should yield very dierent
results For the sample in Column c  the coincidence of initial and minimum occurs only for 	
percent of observations The results can be taken as evidence against that hypothesis  since they
remain qualitatively the same This is also in line with the results presented in Tables 
 on page 	
and  on page 
  when one or the other of the contractual measures is included
Up until this point  a job contributed more than one observation to the analysis All the models
predictions collapse to the same one  that of a negative correlation between wages and alternative
utilities  when we consider only starting wages  since this rst observation is necessarily also current
and minimal
  
This may serve as a check on our previous estimates Column d reports results from a regression
of starting wages on unemployment at the time of the contract start The coecient is negative
and signcant Furthermore  taking Column c as the comparison group  the coecient is on the
same order of magnitude as the sum of all three coecients in the more general specication
Columns e and f split the sample again into blue and white collar workers  and the results
  
Since earnings are observed only once yearly in the GSOEP  this is not exactly true  but close enough
	
are clearer than in Table   For blue collar workers the predominant inuence is contemporaneous
whereas white collar workers are strongly aected by initial conditions though some contemporane
ous variation persists It thus seems that the implicit contract model is a better description of the
earnings evolution of white collar workers whereas some contemporaneous model better explains
the variation in the earnings of blue collar workers
We had argued in Section  that there is substantial coordination or spillover between regional
bargaining units in Germany If bargaining is what determines the contemporaneous correlation
between earnings and unemployment than one would expect that regional variations should not
matter On the other hand regional mobility of Germans is low ref here and so local labor
market may matter for individual decisions such as are modeled in the implicit contracting models
as well as in e	ciency or spot market models Thus if e	ciency wages determine contemporaneous
correlation one would expect regional variations to aect earnings A similar argument goes for
initial and lowest unemployment rate in the implicit contract models where if geographical mobility
inuences economic mobility the relevant outside options are local
Table 

 on page  reports results for several dierent specications Columns a and b are
identical to the same columns in Table 
 on page  where unemployment is measured in levels
In column c the appropriate regional measures are computed in deviations from national means
The only coe	cient now signicantly aecting earnings is the measure of initial unemployment For
workers starting jobs in regions with lower than average unemployment wages stay lower for the
rest of their careers consistent with the implicit contract model No contemporaneous variation at
the regional level aects their earnings However when we reintroduce the level of national unem
ployment measured at the same time in column d the level of contemporaneous unemployment
aects earnings in much the same way as in the original model in column a Notice also that
the point estimate on minimum unemployment is still about equal to the one in column a but is


less precisely estimated 
The results in column d point to the simultaneous presence of and complicated interplay of sev
eral levels of wage and earnings determination  What it suggest is that at the micro level employers
give immobile workers insurance contracts against uctuations in their idiosyncratic productivity 
This wage guarantee is dampened by aggregate uctuations in productivity or whatever shock may
translate into increased unemployment which will aect anybodys earnings  This is consistent
with circumstantial evidence on union inuence in Germany  Note that what is often called prot
sharing is consistent with a union model where bargaining occurs over wages and employment levels
e	cient contracting and this seems to be a plausible scenario for Germany 
  Concluding Remarks
The main result of this paper is twofold  First we have shown that earnings dynamics in Germany
are inuenced by both previous and current labor market conditions  This contrasts with ndings
for the American labor market indicating the preponderance of previous labor market conditions
and it puts a caveat to the analysis in the wage curve literature where wages are only correlated
to current unemployment  No single model is able to entirely explain microeconomic movements of
earnings in Germany 
But and this is the second result a caveat applies  The above result is not universally valid in
all parts of the labor market  A blue collar worker in a small rm will be much more aected by
contemporaneous conditions than say a white collar worker in a large rm controlling for other
aspects of productivity  Whereas the formers earnings move in a way consistent with spot market
models the latters earnings behave if anything according to an implicit contract model 
Furthermore and quite importantly local labor markets matter for individual contracts for



which an implicit contract model or a contracting model seems consistent with the data  but na
tional unemployment covaries with individual earnings  as might be expected in a union bargaining
context if unions bargain over earnings and employment Thus  dierent labor markets seem to
vary substantially as to the sensitivity of earnings to labor market conditions
We nd that the elasticity of current earnings with respect to contemporaneous unemployment
varies between  percent full sample and 	
 percent for men only  using regional and national
unemployment rates  which is comparable in magnitude to coecients found in previous studies
  
Furthermore  we nd the elasticity of current earnings with respect to initial unemployment to be
between  percent men only and 	 percent full sample  again depending on the specications
White collar worker earnings are more sensitive to initial unemployment rates than blue collar
earnings  and viceversa with respect to contemporaneous correlation
The positive sign obtained on the coecient on the best labor market conditions since start of
the job is puzzling in the present context  but disappears once both national and regional variations
in unemployment rates are included in the model
Comparing with previous results for the US labor market Beaudry  DiNardo 		  we nd
that the elasticity of earnings with respect to the initial labor market conditions since the start of
the current job are similar in both economies  if slightly higher in the United States Elasticity with
respect to current unemployment is higher in Germany  the US value of approximately  percent
being about a third to half of the corresponding German one From this  it is fairly dicult to draw
conclusions as to which labor market shows the higher exibility However  a tentative conclusion
is that earnings in Germany seem to show no less exibility with respect to labor market conditions
than US earnings
Finally  though most of the above discussion is couched in the vocabulary of implicit contracts 
  
Blanch ower  Oswald  Wagner 

it is important to point out that other models may well be consistent with the above  ndings
We have pointed out several in Section  Our  ndings as to the size of the  rm seem to show
that contracts in smaller  rms are sensitive to market than those at very large  rms One possible
interpretation is that small  rms are too small to support internal labor markets and thus substitute
the marketplace for it Large  rms on the other hand oer a more stable environment in which
internal labor market and hierarchical incentive systems may function Support is also to be found in
the observation that average tenure in our sample is higher for large  rms implying lower turnover
Given the particular institutional structure of the German labor market we hypothesize that
some model superimposing collective bargaining agreements and individual contract models may be
able to explain our results We do not supply such a model but establish stylized facts which such
a model must be able to explain

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A Appendix
Observations Persons
Full GSOEP dataset used       
Missing data      
Starting year          
Germans living in W Germany    	
Employed   	  
Only FT working persons     
Only unlimited contracts   	   
Restricting to white
blue collar      	
Excluding agriculture public sector     
of which with
Valid gross income      
and     observation     	
Valid net income   	  
and     observation  	   
of which
Men 	     	
Table   Sample reduction

Variable Full sample Men
Mininum national unemployment rate        
Maximum national unemployment rate 	    	
  

Nat unemployment rate start of tenure     
Nat unemployment rate time of interview 	   
Mininum regional unemployment rate      
  
Maximum regional unemployment rate 	 
 		 
Reg unemployment rate start of tenure  	 	 

Reg unemployment rate time of interview 		 
 		 

Contractual hours 	 
 		  
Actual weekly hours 
  
  

Desired hours per week    	  
Net Income in 		
 DM s    

Gross Income in 		
 DM s 
  
 
Bluecollar 
    
Years of education 

 	    
Age   
  
Single dummy   
Female  
Onthejob Tenure months 	    	  	 
Initial experience  
 	  	


Number of obs   

Standard deviations in parenthesis 
Table  Means

Net Earnings
Unemployment Contemporaneous Minimum Rate
Rate at Start Unemployment over Tenure
of Tenure Rate
 a  b  c
Means      
	 Fixed E
ects 
  
 
	
	 Fixed E
ects   
	
	 Fixed E
ects 
  
 
 
	 	
	 Fixed E
ects  
  

	
	 Fixed E
ects 
 

  

	 	
 	 Fixed E
ects  
  

	 	
	 Fixed E
ects 
  

  
 
  
	 	  	
BD	 Fixed e
ects    
	 	 	
Signi cance at
  
 level and
 
 level Standard errors in parentheses All regressions
include experience and tenure up to squared terms education in years hours in logs dummies
for industry marital status single and a time trend Row BD is taken from Table  row
	 in Beaudry 
 DiNardo 
Table   Net earnings specications

Gross Earnings
Unemployment Contemporaneous Minimum Rate
Rate at Start Unemployment over Tenure
of Tenure Rate
 a  b  c
Means      
	 Fixed E
ects  
  
 
	
	 Fixed E
ects   
	
	 Fixed E
ects 
  
 
 	 	
	 Fixed E
ects  
  

	
	 Fixed E
ects  
  

  

	 	
 	 Fixed E
ects  
  

	 	
	 Fixed E
ects 
  

  

  
	 	 	
Signi cance at
  
 level Standard errors in parentheses For regression details see footnote
to Table 
Table   Gross earnings specications
Net earnings Gross earnings
All Men All Men
Unemployment a	 b	 c	 d	
First 
  

 

  

 
	 	 	  	
Current 
  
 
  

  
 
  
	  	 	 	
Minimum  
  

 

  
 
 	 	 	 	
Signi cance at
  
 level
 
 level Standard errors in paren
theses For regression details see footnote to Table 
Table  Full sample and men

Freq Mean Mean
Firmsize tenure initial exp
under     
    	 

  to 
 	 	 			
  	 	 

 to 
 	 	 	
 		 
     

 to 
 	   	
 
	
	    

 and more  	  		
 
	  
  
Standard errors in parentheses  Men only 
Table   Tenure and initial experience by rmsize
Firmsize
      to 
 
 to 
 
 to 
  

Initial 
  


  


 

  


	  	 	 		 

Current 

  

	
  
	
  

 

    	  
Minimum  

  
 
  


 


 

	

	  	 	
 		
 	
Signicance at
  
 level and
 
 level  Standard errors in parentheses  For
regression details see footnote to Table  
Table  Results by rm size net earnings

Firmsize
      to   to   to   
Initial 
  

  

 

 
	

 
 	 	 	   
Current  
  
	
  


  

  
 
      
Minimum  
  
		
  

 

 
 
     
Signi cance at
  
 level
 
 level and
 
at  level Standard errors in
parentheses For regression details see footnote to Table 
Table   Results by rm size gross earnings
Net earnings Gross earnings
Blue collar White collar Blue collar White collar
a b c d
Initial  	  
 

 
 
 


Current  
  

  
	
  
	
  
  	 

Minimum   
 
  
 
 

Observations      
Signi cance at
  
 level Standard errors in parentheses For
regression details see footnote to Table 
Table  Results by worker class

Net earnings  men
National R e g i o n a l
Job start Starting Blue White
            wage collar collar
 a  b  c  d  e  f
Initial 
 

  

 
na  	

  
 
      

  
Current 
  
	
  


  

  


  

 
     	  	    
Minimum 
 

  

  
na  
 
       
  
Observations 
 
 	  

 
Signi cance at
  
 level and
 
 level Standard errors in parentheses For
regression details see footnote to Table 
Table   Regional unemployment rates
Net earnings  men
L e v e l s Detrended Detrend reg
 nat level
 a  b  c  d
Initial unemployment
 Regional 
  

  

 
     
 National 
 

 
  	
Current unemployment
 Regional 	
  
 

     
 National 
  

  
   
Minimum unemployment
 Regional 
  
 
     	
 National 
 

   	

Signi cance at
  
 level
 
 level and
 
at  level Standard errors in paren
theses For regression details see footnote to Table 
Table    Regional and national eects

A  Group eects
As initially pointed out by Moulton   the standard errors reported by OLS for variables
which are constant within groups are biased downwards Their bias depends on the average group
size and the intraclass correlation of the errors Coecient estimates themselves are unbiased
The aggregate variables in our case are the unemployment rates Note however that whereas the
coecient on contemporaneous unemployment is estimated o	 fairly large cells the minimum and
initial unemployment rates vary widely across individuals and cells are thus more numerous and
smaller diminishing the bias in the standard errors For the period under consideration here
 
 there are  years   quarters per year   regions   possible cells for initial
unemployment with approximately   observations On the other hand since most interviews
are completed within a threemonth period all contemporaneous unemployment observations come
from within a single quarter per year leaving  years x  regions  cells The case for minimum
unemployment will lie between these two extremes
All regressions in the main test control for xed e	ects Given the low geographical mobility
in the data  only  moves are observed the xed e	ects absorb any regional e	ects The initial
unemployment rate entering the typical regression is thus the deviation of the initial unemployment
rate at the current job from the average initial unemployment rate for the individual This measure
thus depends on the entire employment history of an individual further reducing the likelihood of
aggregation bias The same applies to minimum unemployment On the other hand contempo
raneous unemployment is still subject to aggregation bias in a xed e	ect specication since all
individuals in the panel will be subject to the same average over the observation period and thus
also to the same deviation from this average
One possible correction for aggregation bias is to adjust the degree of aggregation on both sides
of the regression equation We have therefore regressed the dependent variable on the individual
regressors  including minimum and initial unemployment rate industry dummies and a full set
of  yearbyregion dummy variables The coecient estimates on the yearregion dummies are
thus regressionadjusted regional means
Note that this specication is also more general in its treatment of the time e	ects which in the
results reported in the main text are constrained to be linear
An auxiliary regression of these coecients on year dummies region dummies and on regional
unemployment rates was then run The coecient on unemployment from this regression is not
subject to the aggregation bias described above
Column  c in Table  on the next page reports the relevant results from the two regressions
Column  a of that table repeats the parameter estimates from Column  b of Table  on page 
for the male subsample Column  b reports results when not controlling for xed e	ects in the
same sample Coecients are higher indicating that part of the observed e	ects are actually due
to individual heterogeneity but the general pattern is fairly similar
In all columns the rst two rows report parameter estimates from the microlevel regressions
The third row the parameter estimate for the e	ect of contemporaneous unemployment reports
the estimate from the auxiliary regression in Column  c but from the microlevel regression in
Columns  a and  b The parameter estimates when correcting for aggregation bias lie between
the xed e	ect and crosssectional estimates The relative magnitudes of the estimates are similar
in Columns  a and  c pointing to the fact that regional xed e	ects may account for some of the
variation otherwise captured by individual xed e	ects All parameter estimates are signicantly
di	erent from zero irrespective of the specication chosen
Correcting for aggregation bias and speciying a more general treatment of time e	ects do

Net earnings
Unemployment  a  b  c
First 
 

  
	
  
 
    
	
Minimum 
 

  
	
  
 

    
Current 
  

  

  
     

Corrected for
Aggregation bias No No Yes
Controlling for
Fixed eects Yes No No
Men only  Signicance at
  
 level
 
 level  Stan
dard errors in parentheses  For regression details see text 
Table   Correcting for aggregation bias
not change the general results in this subsample For reasons of parsimony and comparability we
therefore only report results from microlevel regressions throughout the main text
A  Data description
Hours  Hours are reported as contractual hours HRSWKC and actual hours worked HRSWK
in the week preceding the interview If available actual hours are used otherwise contractual
Earnings  The earnings reported is the monthly amount received in the previous month
INCMNET and INCMGRS Information is also reported on average monthly earnings in the
previous year as computed by respondents which we may use this in a later step to control for
representativeness of the answer to INCM
We computed average hourly earnings including overtime pay where we used the reported
actual hours in the week HRSWK prior to the interview if overtime is paid OVERRUL and
contractual hours HRSWKC otherwise multiplying it by the number of weeks in a month
	
 Since wage contracts in Germany usually specify monthly earnings for whitecollar workers
or at least a monthly income wrt hours we use in our regressions a specication with monthly
earnings Unfortunately though actual overtime last month is reported overtime pay is not except
for  
Firm size  is employeereported in 
 categories referring to the rm not the establishment
Years of education  is calculated by the data providers from information given in the inter
view translating into years of education Information is also available on highest degree obtained
Foreigner  The usual control for race in regressions on North American data does not make
sense in Germany We do have information about the immigration status ie if the person is a
foreigner or not and residence according to the old political divisiono of the country ie if the
person resides in East or West Germany SAMPLE In all regressions we exclude both foreigners
and East Germans
Union status  is available only for respondents present in the  
   and   waves We


construct the union status for years in between for those respondents who have not changed jobs as
far back as this can be followed  but we run regressions without this constructed variable  since it
is too incomplete
Married status  We use a dummy for single status Experiments for married status yielded
similar results
Unemployment rates Unemployment rates are taken from yearly volumes of the Statistisches
Jahrbuch    	  which from  on provides national and regional averages
Initial unemployment is taken from the quarter in which the present job started  and the lowest
unemployment is computed by searching over the time between then and the interview date Note
that since jobs contribute multiple yearly observations  the minimum unemployment rate may
dier from one year to the next for the same job
Experience  Wave 	 contained questions about the start of professional life  excluding ap

prenticeships For respondents not present in Wave 	  or not having responded to these questions 
we control for exit from schoolapprenticeship and entry into the labor market when setting true
experience
The labor market history supplement in  asked questions on earlier jobs Specically 
the age when rst gainful employment was entered CP and whether there any professional
changes have occurred since CP	  CP	 age are reported The second question may be
misleading The question pertains to Beruf  meaning profession  which may very well be changed
while remaining with the same employer Though tempting to use as a measure for tenure  we opt
for the cautious side  and only use CP for potential labor market experience One possible
use is to control for occupation speci
c tenure We retain this variable for all years  controlling in
 and  if the start year thus set is later than the wave year For job starters in subsequent
years  we ll in this variable in the year they rst report their job start which may be for the two
past years
Nevertheless  the information is not always available  and in the paper we only use potential
experience However  for those individuals for whom the comparison is possible  the two variables
have a high degree of correlation
Tenure  The respondents are asked the year and month when they started working for their
current employer
  
This gives a precise notion of tenure However  the question was only asked of
job changers in waves 	 and  For these  we construct the tenure variable as follows In a rst step 
we ll in from below for those that have not changed jobs  carrying forward the response given in
wave  In a second step  if the respondents did not answer No to the question Have there been
changes in your professional circumstances  we check to see if they have started a job for the rst
time Though answering this question is an experience question rather than a tenure question  we
use it to control for consistency in the tenure question Specically  if the tenure answer is missing 
we ll in from the answer to the job start question The year is also checked for consistency  the reply
to the job start question serving to correct tenure in case of disagreement This might conceivably
  
The version in all waves is
Seit wann sind Sie bei Ihrem jetzigen Arbeitgeber besch ftigt Falls Sie Selbst ndiger sind geben Sie
bitte an seit wann Sie Ihre jetzige T tigkeit ausben
to which the correct translation would be
Since when have you been employed by your present employer If you are selfemployed please state
since when you have been in your current occupation
Note that this is translated in some waves in the English version as  been employed in your present job	 The
latter translation may be ambiguous
	
overstate tenure  though not experience
In a third step  we control for consistency of the variables thus lled in If the respondent
specically replies that she has changed employers  we force the start year variable to be consistent
with the response Otherwise  if the job situation has not changed 
  
we force the start year
SYEAR to be consistent with the oncelagged value of this variable
Industry  Earlier years of the survey only asked the industry variable of job changers Later
years lled it in for all respondents We do this as well for the earlier years  conditional in all cases
on no job change having occured
Deflation  The ination rate used is the ocial German index as reported by the BLS

Ination rates are only available on a monthly base starting in 		
 We use the yearend averages
throughout to deate net and gross earnings  expressing them in 		 DM Base year is 	
  
The exact question is  Has your job situationprofessional life  beru iche Situation changed since the beginning
of wave year	 Please enter if any of the following applies to you
 and if yes
 when The categories are  Took
up a job for the rst time in my life  Gone back to work after a break  Have a job with a new employer 
Became self	employed 
 Have changed position within the rm  No none of these Possible answers to the
rst ve are the month of the year preceding the interview and the month of the interview year in which that change
occured

ftpstatsblsgovpub
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